Story by Kasra Aarabi, Saeid Golkar
Jul 03 • 4 min read • Updated 1d ago
The Iranian regime’s oligarchic clans are at war with each other – and this conflict may soon spiral beyond control.
This fight is not over ideology or the future direction of the Islamic Republic: all the oligarchic clans are Islamist; some wear turbans, others wear military uniforms, and some wear suits.
In other words, they all subscribe to the core tenets of Shia Islamism in Iran: the forceful imposition of Sharia law domestically, support for the so-called Axis of Resistance militia network, anti-Americanism, and the goal of eradicating the Israel (driven by innate anti-Semitism).
But they are competing to protect and advance their power and economic interests amid the vacuum that emerged after the elimination of Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader, who had operated as the godfather of these clans.
The latest manifestation of this infighting has erupted in the most unlikely of places: the Assembly of Experts – a body of 88 clerics who, in theory, appoint and oversee the authority of the supreme leader.
Last week, 73 members of the normally silent assembly made an unusual public intervention in the form of a statement on the ongoing negotiations with the United States and the recently-signed Memorandum of Understanding
The statement de facto criticised Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) over its conduct of the negotiations with Washington, suggesting the officials had moved beyond the “red lines” of the supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei.
It said in Farsi: “All officials should respect that, in the system of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the opinion and directives of the Supreme Leader are decisive. Once informed of the Leader’s definitive view, no official may act contrary to it.”
After its publication, Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Busheri, chairman of the Assembly of Experts’ secretariat and spokesperson, immediately stated that he was completely unaware of the statement and that, while he did not oppose its content, its signatories had broken convention and published it without coordination with him.
Remarkably, however, senior members of the secretariat – including Ayatollah Movahedi Kermani, Ayatollah Arafi, Ayatollah Araki and Ayatollah Rajavi – were amongst the signatories of the statement. In fact, only three members of the secretariat had not signed the statement, including Hosseini Busheri.
The very fact that such elite infighting is now unfolding openly within the regime’s most important clerical body is particularly telling.
The Assembly of Experts is effectively representative of the regime’s clerical class. First and foremost, it shields and advances the interests of the clergy, which have long been guaranteed by the supremacy of the position of the supreme leader.
When Ali Khamenei was alive, this power was beyond dispute. But the same cannot be said of Mojtaba, his son and successor, in charge.
Not only is it clear that the new supreme leader no longer holds the same authority as his father, but Mojtaba’s complete public absence has only deepened the power vacuum that has emerged after his predecessor’s death.
This has heightened the anxiety of the Assembly of Experts, which fears its political and economic interests would be at risk should the supreme leader’s position be undermined.
Their statement therefore reveals not only in-fighting between the different oligarch clans of the Islamist regime, but also that the clerical class is scrambling to preserve its political and economic privileges in the face of an increasingly uncertain succession.
For now, these divisions over power and money have been managed and contained in the name of Mojtaba.
His name still serves as a form of political glue. Even in his absence, different factions can invoke his authority to discipline rivals, justify decisions, and avoid a more open confrontation over the regime’s leadership.
But this arrangement is fragile because authority that is not visibly embodied cannot hold for long, particularly in a regime where the leader’s personal presence has historically been central to elite management.
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If Mojtaba fails to appear at his father’s funeral, it will dramatically intensify speculation about his physical condition and could accelerate factional efforts to prepare for a second succession crisis.
Such a moment would not merely raise questions about one man’s fate.
It could expose the deeper structural crisis facing the Islamic Republic: that a regime built around the absolute authority of one man may no longer have a leader capable of imposing order on the very factions that depend on his authority for their own survival.
The Assembly of Experts’ intervention is therefore more than an isolated episode; it is a sign that the Islamic Republic’s internal balance of power is shifting.
The clerical class, the IRGC-linked networks, the security bureaucracy, and political-economic factions are all manoeuvring to protect their interests in a system whose central source of authority has been weakened.
While these rivalries may remain contained in the short term, the post-Ali Khamenei order is increasingly vulnerable to open elite conflict.
What appears today as a dispute over negotiations may soon become a broader struggle over who truly rules the Islamic Republic.
Kasra Aarabi is director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) research at United Against Nuclear Iran
Saeid Golkar is senior adviser at United Against Nuclear Iran and UC Foundation Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga























